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One thing we all agree is that meanings do not just fall out of the sky; they were and are at least in 
important part generated by what users of signs do with them. This suggests that the semantics of natural 
language is the product of the history of its pragmatics. It does not automatically follow, of course, that 
therefore the right way to go about giving a theory of meaning is in some sense to do it from the pragmatic 
end: but in the larger project I wish to suggest a reason for doing so, and I suggest that what increases the 
plausibility of this thought is evidence that certain problem cases in our understanding of language are 
amenable to an approach in which pragmatic considerations are given full emphasis.
I do this in this paper by giving a brief sketch of part of a theory I call Perfect Speaker Theory (PST), which, 
despite its grand name, is a modest attempt to provide a methodological perspective from which to comment 
on some familiar debates in the philosophy of language and mind. For present purposes, it is the simple and 
natural way that PST deals with certain well-worn problems in these debates that prompts the suggestion 
that pragmatic considerations should be treated as irreducibly central to meaning. 
At this juncture I should state that by 'pragmatics' I mean what, over and above what is standardly assigned 
to theories of structure, reference, sense and satisfaction conditions, relates to the use of expressions of the 
language on given occasions, where what the speaker intends to convey, and the means the speaker 
employs in conveying it on the occasion, are especially in focus. I want to say that among pragmatic 
considerations questions of force and point (for my purposes especially point) are central. These facets of 
linguistic behaviour include, essentially, considerations about interaction between speakers and their 
audiences. 
I found, in working at these ideas, that they afford independent reason for agreeing with some of what Grice 
says. I can only claim some agreement, because Grice is professedly inclined to accept two things which PST 
is not, namely, the distinctness of meaning and use, and the privileged role of a notion of truth in any 
account of natural discourse. PST's commitment to arguing for the dominance of pragmatic considerations is 
allied to a view that notions of truth (which in my view is not one insubstantial thing but a number of 
different substantial things for which the expression 'truth' is a homophonic dummy) play roles of a different 
kind (I argue for this view elsewhere.) A major tension between PST and Grice's theory is that because the 
former has it that the crux in meaning is point, which is to be explained in terms of speakers' intentions to 
mean something on an occasion, conventional meaning is to be characterised as the dry residue of speakers' 
meanings, agreed in the language community under constraints of publicity and stability (another view I 
argue for elsewhere). Now Grice has given considerable attention to showing that speakers' intentions and 
conversational maxims are insufficient for a full account. PST aims to suggest that from these resources a 
satisfying account of meaning can be brought into view without having to import considerations from outside 
the reach of pragmatics, suitably construed.
There are many debates about language which can be exploited to show how PST pushes us in the indicated 
direction, but I will advert to just four very familiar examples, and a fifth less familiar one. The problem 
about using familiar examples is that the literature on them is large, so with no space to review it I have to 
be unceremonious; and also, everyone has a favourite view about these cases, so doubtless what follows will 
seem too swift. The cases are (1) the proper understanding of natural language analogues of logical 
constants, (2) presupposition-failures for certain uses of verbs of doing and trying, where the 
appropriateness of certain locutions comes into question because some implied condition for their 
appropriate utterance fails to obtain; (3) some questions about referential uses of definite descriptions, and 
(4) a certain application of the Twin Earth story. This looks like a heterogeneous collection, but I submit it as 
a virtue of PST that it identifies some patterns in the aetiology of problems arising in relation to them.
And finally (5) I suggest that PST provides a way of approaching the question whether, for any given natural 
language, there is something that counts as 'the language', or whether a natural language is a vaguely 
bounded family of idiolects, perhaps as numerous as their speakers. But first it is necessary to define a 
Perfect Speaker (PS), and to explain why he is so called. A PS of his language is one who so uses it that 
whenever he makes an assertion (and mutatis mutandis for other kinds of utterance) he: 
(1) expresses his intended meaning as fully as, if not more fully than, his audience needs in the 
circumstances; 
(2) expresses his intended meaning as exactly as, if not more exactly than, his audience etc; and 
(3) is as epistemically cautious as the circumstances do or might require, if not more so, with respect to the 
claims made or presupposed in or by what he says. 
Together these conditions make the PS determining or overdetermining in respect of the point and 
epistemology of his utterances. Note that they do not cover the same ground as Grice's maxims – although 
there is some overlap – and they do not pretend to be regulative for ordinary communication. Together they 
make a PS of his language one who is in practice absolved a certain duty, namely, the responsible speaker's 
duty to stand ready to clarify, qualify or defend what he says if called upon to do so by hearers who have 
and are exercising anything recognisable as normal competence with the language in use. The PS is absolved 
the duty of restatement because he is by definition never in a position to have to fulfil it, as long as his 
audience is as specified. 
The PS is of course an idealisation, and one which immediately prompts questions. So it is important to be 
clear about what kind of idealisation he is. Let us distinguish him from two other possible kinds of idealised 
speaker whom I shall call the Ideal Speaker and the Optimal Ordinary Speaker. (Strictly, it is only the former 
who is an idealisation, because there might in fact be Optimal Ordinary Speakers). The Ideal Speaker (IS) 
satisfies the first two conditions, but for a third has 'is omniscient'. Thus the IS is god or relevantly godlike. 
One immediate difference between an IS and a PS as I define the latter is that the language of an omniscient 
speaker would have to be apt for the expression of everything, whatever that means, whereas the language 
of a speaker who suffers the finitary predicament (is finite in knowledge and powers) cannot be guaranteed 
to be apt for the expression of everything. So not only does a PS differ from an IS in being subject to finitary 
constraints, but his language (which is an ordinary natural language after all) carries the mark of that 
finitude also. This might make it seem that the PS should not be so described, but rather that he should be 
thought of as an Optimal Ordinary Speaker (OOS), i.e., an ordinary speaker who simply is as careful and 
precise as he can be, and that is all. We might be trying to be such speakers when we do philosophy or law; 
so OOS–or 'optimal speaking' by ordinary speakers – might be relatively commonplace. But there are 
significant differences between OOSs so considered, and the PS I require for my model. One is that an OOS,
an ordinary speaker doing his best, must be allowed at times to be in states where the beliefs and intentions 
that determine the content of what he says are not transparent to himself. This means that an OOS may at 
times fail to satisfy (1) and (2), and at times all of (1) to (3). But by stipulation a PS is one who always 
satisfies all three. So his meaning, intentions and
beliefs are transparent to himself. Another and consequent reason is that an OOS has the duty of 
restatement, i.e., he would fail to be doing his best if he did not stand ready to clarify or defend what he said 
if asked by linguistically competent hearers to do so. But his obligations here are a function of the 
defeasibility of his attempts to do his best as a speaker. By my definition a PS is one to whom this duty is 
inapplicable for the reasons given. 
So a PS is better than optimal; and he therefore comes between an IS and an OOS, although he is somewhat 
closer to the latter than the former. A second stab at a definition adds these comments to conditions (1) to 
(3).
It should be immediately added, if it is not already clear, that the PS is conceived as one whose interlocutors 
are always ordinarily competent speakers of the same language. He is not a citizen of a kingdom of PSs.
Some comments are needed on the conditions. The third, that the PS is epistemically cautious in the way 
described, suggests that he is governed by an ethics of epistemic caution which at least imposes an 
obligation not just to be sensitive, but to articulate or to be ready to articulate sensitivity, to the possibility of 
epistemic defeat of any claim presupposed or made on its occasion. This condition is vital to resolving certain 
problems, one of which I consider. But it is not a requirement that a PS should be regressively hedging about 
his claims, making explicit such protases to his remarks as 'if there is a world at all...' and the like. A PS is 
not by stipulation absurd, only pedantic. But it is a corollary of this duty of (so to speak) maximal epistemic 
caution that the PS be as well-informed as is required to fulfil conditions (1) to (2). This is not a demand that 
the PS be an IS, i.e., omniscient: it is rather that his use of the expressions of the language should be 
conformable to what I shall later describe as a Best Dictionary for the Language–that is, one which makes 
use of the best current theories of what use of the language's expressions constitutes talk of.
A comment on the PS himself is prompted by the first two conditions and his correlative freedom from the 
duty of restatement, and this comment in turn underlines a substantial point often made about a feature of 
language. In line with (1) to (2), the PS never indulges in metaphor or irony if there is a risk of 
misunderstanding–which even with normally competent hearers there often enough is; and he never 
indulges in ambiguity. He is, in short, in danger of being a bore. But his potential boringness is interesting in 
this respect: that it reveals one of the constraints imposed on him by language (there are plenty of others). 
For whereas by (1) and (2) he shuns ambiguity, he cannot avoid vagueness, except by stipulative means, 
which he will not anyway normally wish to resort to. He is of course minimally vague: a major use of certain 
resources in the language, namely adjectives and adverbs, is the reduction of vagueness, allowing both 
ordinary speakers and a PS to be maximally specific; maximally but not completely, because vagueness is a 
built-in feature of language upon which a good deal of its utility turns. But this does not generate an 
inconsistency with condition (2), which is that the PS expresses exactly his intended meaning, for one can 
exactly mean to say what cannot be expressed otherwise than by use of a vague expression. For example: 
suppose the PS says, 'X is bald'. That can be exactly what he intends to convey, independently of questions 
about the degree to which X has less hair on his head than Y to whom the PS does not apply this predicate. 
It is of course possible for a non-arbitrary stipulation to be made with respect to some vague expression 
which precisifies it relative to a certain purpose. One can say that a person n % of whose scalp has a 
covering of fewer than n hairs per some measure, is bald. Suppose registered bald people by law have to 
wear a white hat on sunny days. Then the legal instrument which enacts this law would have to be precise: 
trichological police would need a definition to work to. Just such precisifications in fact obtain in registration 
of blind people to whom welfare benefits are due.
But as we see, a PS would normally neither need nor desire to go for precisification of vague expressions, 
however non-arbitrary relative to a purpose: for their vagueness is exactly what from time to time he needs. 
The constraint they impose is not a limitation.
These comments together give us a second stab at a definition of a PS which will suffice for the present. I 
shall sometimes speak of the three conditions as rules which bind the PS in his practice. Another important 
feature of PS-hood, a corollary of the third condition, emerges as the model is applied. I turn to that in a 
moment. First I will just mention a reason for using the adjective 'perfect' in my label. It is because it is 
informatively symmetrical with the use of the adjective made by Russell and others in their attempts to 
define a 'perfect language'. That was a programme aimed at specifying the underlying logical structure of 
natural language. In addition to the assumption that there is such a thing, there was a further, at least at the 
outset: that it admits of a uniquely correct representation. The ambition was to set out in algebraic 
description of logical form something which, like Leibniz's longed-for universal characteristic, would 
completely and unambiguously represent what is said by any natural languages. And this in turn was held to 
have exciting metaphysical potential, since the idea was that what there is can be read off from what the 
language says. Well: all I need say is that I propose we substitute idealisation of the speaker for idealisation 
of the language: instead of looking for the perfect language, let us try to describe a PS of ordinary language 
and see where it takes us. I think such a task justifies the assumption upon which it rests, namely, that it is 
not the language that says things, but its speakers. 
I turn now to apply PST to cases. The suggestion is this: application of the theory reveals a certain pattern in 
what generates the problems, namely, a falling-short, either because of the usual vicissitudes of discourse in 
an imperfect world, or artificially by hypothesis, of a PS's conditions; and it therefore suggests a solution to 
them, which is to make explicit appeal to the point of utterance and/or to identify the epistemic deficit 
requiring remedy. 
The first case I consider – and I consider all of them briefly – is that of the natural language analogues of the 
logical constants, classically interpreted. I assume familiarity with the standard examples, and just register 
them here. On a certain natural view, one central use of 'and' in English is to convey temporal succession, 
one central use of 'or' conveys the speaker's ignorance of the truth-value of the disjuncts, and one central 
use of conditional statements is to assert that accepting an antecedent is a ground for accepting its 
consequent, and normally that there is anyway uncertainty about whether the situation denoted or described 
by the antecedent obtains.
The difficulties felt about these natural uses of the natural language operators arise from their divergence 
from their formal analogues. Their content exceeds that of their formal analogues, and they are therefore 
more fruitful in implications. Suppose it is given that a particular disjunction is true. We thus know that at 
least one of the disjuncts is true. But we are not in a position to infer something of a different order, such as 
that an asserter of this disjunction is either ignorant of the disjunctsí truth-values, or might be dissembling, 
guessing, joking or some such. The additional content is provided by pragmatic considerations: those 
specified in terms of the speaker's intentions and certain contextual features.
Faced with questions about these divergences, our inclination is to look for mappings. Strawson, for example, 
held that the acceptability or truth of a conditional rests on whether acceptance of the antecedent is a 
ground for accepting the consequent, but that this is not sufficient for a conditional's truth or acceptability, 
for which the truth of the associated material conditional, entailed by the natural language conditional, is also 
required. From this it follows
that whenever an associated material conditional is false, its associated natural language conditional is false 
also, and that there is a problem about what to say of natural language conditionals whose associated 
material conditionals are true but in which it is obviously the case that the antecedent states no ground for 
acceptance of the consequent, for some such reason as, say, sheer irrelevance of one to the other. 
The PST offers the following way with the matter. For a PS, the governing question concerns what the point 
is of choosing to say things one way rather than another. Consider the conjunction and disjunction cases. Let 
us accept that the most natural construction to place on someone's saying 'he jumped into the swimming 
pool and put on his trunks' is that the circumstances were such that the man referred to put on his trunks in 
the water. And let us likewise accept that if someone says 'he's either in Austria or Switzerland' that the 
speaker does not know in which of the two countries he is to be found. In the first case, if the reverse 
temporal order were meant, the situation would have to be regarded as non-standard, or the speaker as not 
fully competent. Either way, the point of the utterance is at risk of being obscured. In the second case, if the 
natural implication is false, a different explanation of the speaker's point offers: the speaker dissembles, 
jokes, or something like. But both in the account to be given of the natural thing to say about what the 
speaker intends to convey, and in the account to be given of the ways things can go wrong or differently, the 
key is the point of the utterance. A PS by his rules seeks to convey exactly his point, and so if he chooses to 
say 'he jumped into the swimming pool and put on his trunks' rather than 'he put on his trunks and jumped 
into the swimming pool,' or 'he put on his trunks while jumping into the swimming pool,' or any other 
variation of the temporal relation between the jumping-in and putting-on events, then that is what he means 
to say. So a PS means the standard implications of saying something a certain way to be present in saying it 
that way.
The problems (or supposed problems, as this intuitive move suggests) of the divergence between the natural 
language and formal cases are on this view purely an artefact of taking too seriously the syntactic similarity 
of 'and' to ampersand, 'or' to the 'if–then' to arrow. The meanings of the second in each pair are determined 
by their truth-tables, that is, by purely material considerations. But those of the first in each pair cannot be 
explained without reference to the pragmatic features which determine a speaker's choice of just this rather 
than that way of saying something: which is to say, his point. This is revealed simply enough by answers to 
the question, 'why would a PS say it that particular way?' 
So the observation is that application of conditions (1) and (2) (the full and exact expression conditions) 
make choice of a way of saying something wholly deliberate, so that every natural construction to be placed 
on saying it that way is what saying it that way is intended to convey, so if – and we accept they do –
natural language conjunctions, disjunctions and conditionals carry the implicatures identified, then if a PS did 
not mean them to be taken in what he says, he would say it otherwise. (He would, say, qualify 
appropriately).
The same analysis in terms of point reduces the problem in the second case I consider, again briefly, namely 
that of what might be called condition-failure, although it turns out, as I shall claim, that this is a misnomer. 
The debate in Austin, Searle and Grice is as familiar as the foregoing, and needs as little setting up here as it 
did. The problem concerns what account should be given of what is implied by saying that–to take two 
familiar examples – someone omitted to do something or that someone tried to do something. Using those 
familiar examples from Grice, it is natural to take it that the sentence 'A omitted to turn on the light' implies 
that A might have been expected to do so, and 'A tried to turn on the light' that some difficulty afflicted A in 
this matter, and indeed, most likely, that he therefore failed to turn on the light. So it is natural to take as a 
condition of the appropriateness of saying 'A omitted to turn on the light', rather than saying he did not turn 
on the light, that in some way there was an obligation on him to do so which he did not fulfil, or that he had 
intended to do so but forgot, or chose not to, or the like. If none of these things are the case, then it is 
inappropriate to use the verb 'omit'. If therefore someone says that A omitted to turn on the light, an 
audience is thereby licensed to make the appropriate inference. Mutatis mutandis the same applies to the 
'tried' case. Our inclination would be to put the point by saying that it is a condition of the use of 'omitted' 
and 'tried' in these cases that the implications hold.
The problem as standardly conceived relates to the truth-evaluation of sentences for which such conditions 
fail. Suppose it is false that there was an expectation that A would turn on the light, and A did not turn on 
the light. Then is one to say that the sentence 'A omitted to turn on the light' is false or truth-valueless? Well, 
consider the PS. According to his rules his choice of ways of saying what he does is governed by the 
requirement to make his point explicit. If it is standard to use 'omit' and 'try' in given cases because the 
point of doing so is given by these conditions for their appropriateness, then only if they obtain would the PS 
use them. This obstructs the alleged problem by stressing the directionality of the dependence: to use 'omit' 
or 'try' is to say that these conditions obtain. Here I shall restrict the notion of 'saying that' to: expressly 
conveys. ('Saying that' is not coterminous with asserts – for a liar 'says that' but does not assert – and we 
must be reasonable about what the utterer intends by way of implication of what he says: he does not 
consciously have to imply every implication of what he says, given that their number might be 
unmanageably large). The point of an utterance using these locutions is not given by contraposing, although 
what the contrapositive says is true (that if not-X then not-A omitted): so in determining choice of 
expression a PS, as the speaker who is expressly mindful of what one is taken to be saying in saying 
something in this particular way, uses the expressions in question only if he means to say that the conditions 
obtain. To say that 'A omitted to do X' is to say that (giving this idiom full weight) there was an expectation 
that he would. If there is no such expectation, there is at best no point in using 'omit', and at worse it 
deceives the audience. For the PS, accordingly, the problem cannot arise. I take this to mean that there is no 
problem and that a moral offers: that the property of evaluation is not truth-value but 'appropriateness', 
understood as parasitic on point.
The third case is also a straightforward one for the theory: it shows that the appearance of a difference 
between two kinds of uses of definite descriptions is an artefact of an underlying problem-generator which 
the theory exposes. Recall the familiar examples: 'Her husband is kind to her', where the man is not her 
husband, and 'the man drinking champagne is happy tonight', where the man is drinking fizzy water. And we 
are familiar with Donnellan's view. Now consider the PS in these cases. He intends to say something about 
someone, and in the example cases what he wishes to say is that someone is kind to her or is happy tonight. 
In order to fulfil this intention he has to pick out the target of his remark for his audience. The possibility that 
a description which he believes applies to the referent might get the audience's attention to the target 
without in fact being true of it is one which falls within the range of epistemic defeats to which the PS is 
required by his rules to be sensitive and, where doing so is germane, to articulate sensitivity. So he means, 
and therefore might say, 'The man whom I take to be her husband', 'the man whom I take to be drinking 
champagne'. Now the descriptions refer by attributing something to the referent by means of which the 
audience can pick him out. In such practice all descriptions are thus attributive–they attribute to the 
referents they pick out a property they are believed to have on the basis of which they are successfully 
identifiable. For this latter purpose, it is sufficient that on the occasion of use there is a presumption shared 
by speaker and audience that the belief could be true. This is different from Searle's account, given in terms 
of aspects. 
Suppose, however improbably, that there are no other aspects which in the circumstances could direct the 
audience's attention to the man whom the speaker says is happy tonight. It would remain enough that it is a 
plausible belief for the speaker and audience to hold about him, and which the speaker can exploit for 
referential purposes, that he is drinking champagne.
It seems entirely natural to say that what the PS does in these cases is what all speakers are 
enthymematically doing anyway, as an entirely natural extrapolation of the cases shows: if the audience 
responds, 'he is not her husband, he is her lover', 'it is not champagne, it is Perrier water', the speaker 
replies, 'Oh well I thought he or it was such-and-such–but anyway you know what I mean'.
This does not defend in any way Russell's allegedly pure attributive theory, in which the form of the example 
is represented as 'the uniquest x to satisfy F, Gs', because the epistemic restraint built into specification of F 
imports something which is additional to the purely conventional aspect of the other expressions constituting 
F. We can best see what is at work by reminding ourselves of Kripke's suggestion. For Kripke, the distinction 
lies between semantic and speaker reference. For some idiolect, the semantic referent of an indexical-free 
designator is fixed by general intentions of speakers to pick out a given object by its means. Speakers' 
referents are given by specific intentions on specific occasions to refer to a given object. And again familiarly, 
Kripke identifies simple and complex cases; in the former, a speaker's specific intention just is his general 
intention. In the latter, his specific and general intentions diverge, but as a matter of fact he believes that his 
specific intention determines the same object as his general intention. He might be right or wrong but still 
succeed in referring. On this view, D's 'attributive' case is nothing but the simple case, his 'referential' case 
nothing but the complex case.
On the PS view, however, all cases are to be understood as complex cases. Reflecting on the oddity of 
Kripke's distinction suggests why they have to be so. It is surely never the case, intentions to deceive apart, 
that speakers believe that their specific and general referential intentions diverge. Their choice of designating 
expression is governed by a desire to succeed in making reference. So as a matter of fact speakers are 
always in Kripke's complex case: they believe that their specific and general intentions coincide. Indeed, the 
distinction between the intentions is not one that speakers make from inside their referring practice: it is one 
that retrospectively offers in theoretical reflection on the fact that many beliefs are defeasible. 
But the PS builds recognition of this fact of life into his practice. So his is expressly the complex case: his 
specific intention to refer is effected by articulably cautious attribution of certain properties to the referent by 
means of expressions whose conventional meaning is apt for the task.
Among the points worth noting here are the following. A familiar contrast between conventional meaning and 
speaker meaning lies in the offing of those remarks: it is just such a Gricean distinction from which Kripke 
takes his start, but this way with the outcome hints that any account of conventional meaning is, pace Grice, 
parasitic upon an account of speaker meaning: that the former is, in a sense worth specifying, the dry 
residue of agreements forced among speakers seeking success for their intentions to mean. This is a point 
which lies just off-stage in this paper.
The second is that what gave rise to the debate about a reference-attribute distinction is ellipsis: the thought 
is that making speakers express too little of what a model speaker–the PS–would say is exactly what 
generates the problem. And there is nothing philosophically problematic about ellipsis.
But now we need to bring in another feature of PS-hood, implied by the conditions but not so far exploited. 
This feature comes out in the final case I consider: a certain employment of Putnam's Twin Earth argument.
Putnam challenged two received assumptions, the first being that to know the meaning of an expression is to 
be in a certain sort of psychological state, and the second being that the meaning of an expression 
determines its extension. These assumptions entail that psychological states determine the extension of 
terms. Putnam's twin-earth case purports to show that this cannot be so, giving us his celebrated conclusion 
that meanings are not in the head. Of course this applies just when the psychological states in question are 
narrow, that is, understood concordantly with 'methodological solipsism', the view that psychological states 
supervene on intrinsic states of an individual considered independently of anything besides, in particular 
without relation to environmental factors causing or being effected by those states. Now on PS theory the 
crux for meaning is point: explanation of what an utterance means has to make essential reference to what 
speakers intend to convey. This means that a psychological state privileged by the theory, viz. 'intending to 
mean p', determines the extensions of expressions used. Putnam's twin-earth considerations seem to block 
this. Do they? I suggest not. The claim I think we justify by appeal to PS theory is this–and here we 
introduce the additional feature of PS-hood required by the conditions–: that 'intending to mean p' does 
indeed determine extension, under the two constraints (a) that the words used are used according to what I 
shall label 'the Best Dictionary', which reports the agreed, relatively stable senses of expressions employed 
as tokens of communicative exchange in the linguistic community, and which does so according to the best 
current theories of the linguistic community, and (b) that the PS's audience of normally competent ordinary 
speakers will so take it. 
We get at this thought by noting something about how the twin-earth case is set up. The first thing to note is 
an apparently tangential point, namely that rejection of methodological solipsism does not by itself entail 
some kind of realism about the domain of application of the terms whose meanings are to be understood 
broadly. For so far all that we have identified as required in addition to a speaker's knowledge of meaning is 
the existence of other speakers whose interactions with him and one another constrain that knowledge. If 
this is not enough to serve as the broad context, then we need to find the reason in Putnam's twin-earth 
argument. Does his argument show that unless there is H2O and XYZ out there on earth and twin-earth 
respectively, Oscar and his twin could not respectively have meant 'water' and 'water'? That of course is not 
what Putnam sought to conclude: his argument was not aimed at proving the existence of the external world, 
but at showing that meanings cannot be individuated narrowly. So there are three assumptions at work in 
the twin earth case. The existence of the different waters–water H2O and water XYZ–is assumed, as is the 
qualitative identity of the twins' narrow states, as in the twins' woeful ignorance of views current about water 
in their worlds. Thus richly equipped, the argument has no difficulty in delivering its celebrated conclusion. 
But before we accept these premisses in our welcome of the conclusion, we should enquire whether the twin-
earth tale could not be as well or better told, because more parsimoniously told, using just the idea that the 
meanings of expressions in a language are the agreed dry residue of speakers' meanings. 
Any individual's problem is that he does not know everything that all other speaker's jointly know about the 
meaning of the expressions in his language. This is unsurprising: if some best and latest dictionary pooled a 
community's knowledge of meanings, it would be a rare individual whose linguistic knowledge came close. 
Such a dictionary would report the knowledge possessed by the completest speakers–OOSs–including, for 
example, chemists and hydroengineers. Now let us bring in the PS, who knows everything in the best 
dictionary. Note that the PS is not
omniscient, like the IS: he just knows the Best Dictionary, which is finite and fallible, but reports at their 
completest the linguistic community's dry residue agreements over what expressions can be used to do. In 
knowing the meaning of 'water' the PS therefore knows that, in the latest state of chemical theory on earth, 
it is stuff of molecular structure H2O. And let us also introduce the twin-earth PS, who is by definition equally 
up to date. Then he knows that 'water' according to twin-earth chemistry is XYZ. In this idealised state of 
knowledge of meanings- that is, where a PS has at his disposal the linguistic community's best joint 
knowledge–we find that when he says 'water' he intends to refer to water, that is H2O, or in the case of the 
twin-earth PS, then to water XYZ; and so in either case the PS's grasp of the expression's meaning 
determines its extension, and the psychological state in which his grasp of the meaning consists is broad. But 
this is not because it is related, causally or in some other way, to water, but rather to theories about water, 
because he is speaking in conformity with the Best Dictionary, that is, with the fullest shared knowledge of 
meanings, in accordance with the best current theories held by the linguistic community. 
The trick in Putnam's thought experiment is that the people talking about water are ignorant, in the way 
people are apt to be, as to the best current theories about the stuff. So we who know something more about 
H2O than, ex hypothesi, they do, can see the point as to what else is needed for them to achieve a 
successful reference: namely, to intend to refer to just that stuff, and not something that cannot be 
distinguished from it when one's level of knowledge about it is suitably impoverished. Putnam's thought 
experiment does its work because it premisses that the speakers on earth and twin-earth should be 
identically ignorant in respect of what their referential intentions would be if they were ideally, or just more, 
knowledgeable: that is, if they were, or at least approximated the status of, PSs. Now the third condition in 
PS-hood was epistemic caution. The suggestion here is that it is a corollary of being epistemically cautious 
that one be as well informed as one can be for the purposes of satisfying (1)-(2). The PS, in obedience to (3), 
knows (or carries around and consults) the Best Dictionary. So when he refers, he does not do so under 
Putnamiam epistemic privation of the kind suited to making the twin-earth case plausible.
I conclude now by drawing a couple of morals. The point of the PS model is claimed to be that by applying it 
to cases like the ones just canvassed, we get perspicuous accounts of what is being said and done, and they 
show that the problematic character of the canvassed cases is an artefact of failing to give full weight to 
considerations made salient by the pragmatics of Perfect Speaking. What helps with the problem cases is 
appeal to considerations of point and epistemic aptness; the PS is 'perfect' in his practice with respect to 
both–and in being so is such that the problems do not arise for him. This, my inference is, suggests that we 
should look to beliefs and intentions for the basis of a general account of meaning. 
In the first two cases the problems were generated by incomplete determination of point in the formulation 
adopted by a putative ordinary speaker. In the second two cases the problems were generated by epistemic 
underdetermination in the cases; the putative ordinary speakers failed in achieving their intended targets of 
utterance precisely because of it.
A PS perspective on the cases brings a salutary reminder to our attention. It is that no non-idly employed 
sentence of natural language exists outside a pragmatic frame. For every non-idle use of a sentence the 
particularities–how things are in respect of the utterer, his intentions, his audience, the current state of the 
language, and the circumstances of its use – determine the meaning of what is said on that occasion.
It is these two thoughts together that suggest the third – at this juncture I do not claim they do more –
namely that the conventional meanings of expressions in natural language are the precipitates of the 
linguistic community's tacit agreements to place the use made of certain signs under publicity and (relative) 
stability constraints, so that the ends of communication can be realised. These agreements are the 
conventions which dictionaries report. Any account of meaning so understood would have on this view to 
make essential reference to the pragmatic considerations–and central among them, point–which figure thus 
in its genesis.
Now it is widely held that–and I quote Searle–"meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter 
of convention" and in illustration he quotes Wittgenstein's remark in Philosophical Investigations, 'Say "it's 
cold here" and mean 'it's warm here"'. There is no inconsistency between agreeing with this and accepting 
what the PS theory says is central. For one thing, conventional meanings are, so the theory seeks to suggest, 
the precipitate of intentions anyway: what an expression means is what , in effect, it is intended to mean by 
the linguistic community. For another, nothing in PS theory excludes the obvious, which is that the point of a 
speaker's utterances, even a PS's utterances, cannot be individuated independently of facts about the 
conventional meanings of the expressions he uses, the context, the speaker's attitudes, and whatever other 
pragmatic features are required besides. But what it does do is to say that point figures centrally.
By way of conclusion, and even more briefly than in the familiar problem cases mentioned, I suggest that 
among the other things PST can offer is a simple solution to the question whether there is such a thing as 
'the language' for any natural language. The thought that there is such a thing is held by some to play the 
role that naive realism does in theories of perception; it is the dumbo view, to be replaced by more 
sophisticated views such as that there are as many personal (so to speak) paroles as speakers, and that 
what we too loosely call communication is in fact a form of translation or, more accurately, interpretation. A 
natural desire to respond that at least a notional 'the language' is required to provide a norm–which among 
other things can be invoked to explain such phenomena as (say) the differing divergences of idiolects from 
majority intelligibility–might be met with the riposte that such norms are in fact constituted not by something 
which is genuinely 'the language' but by the family of idiolects of an historically favoured class of speakers 
(the currently rich, the currently powerful, the people currently in charge of the culture. There could be–after 
the revolution, say, there might be – quite different folk in these roles, speaking a different family of 
idiolects). And so the debate might proceed. But one thing that would help to give it shape would be to offer 
something that could count as a criterion of identity for 'the language' if there is such a thing. This is where 
PST comes in: for such a criterion is offered by saying: the language is what the PS speaks. And this 
genuinely does offer a normative conception across which mappings must fall if the very idea of an idiolect of 
some language is itself to make sense.
